So there’s this entity. Its modern incarnation was birthed largely due to the efforts of an iconic leader, who continues to cast a long shadow — long after his departure. This leader had instituted a rigid system of rules and control, and after he was out of the picture, a reform movement began that sought to liberalize the entity. However, recently a hardliner has assumed control and many of the liberal reforms have been rolled back as part of a return to the orthodoxy.

That’s the recent history of Iran. It’s not a perfect analogy, but it’s also the story of the Princeton basketball program.

A couple of years ago I watched a broadcast of Princeton game with a former Tiger basketball standout who had played under Pete Carril. I asked this former player if what he was seeing from Princeton was drastically different from what he had run back in his playing days. His response was something to the effect of, “Are you kidding? It’s totally different.” He pointed out that a lot of the dribble drives and shots early in the shot clock would not have gone over very well with Carril. After a while he did recognize one set — “Chin” — but said the players were taking some options that weren’t available to him.

John Thompson III had to deal with some grumbling from the fan base about the changes he made to the storied Princeton program. Usually the critics complained about the lack of a win against a big-time opponent. Sure, there were close calls at Texas, Oklahoma, and Minnesota, and Princeton lead those same Longhorns at halftime in the 2004 NCAA Tournament, but the trademark Princeton upset eluded Thompson. His liberalization of the offense was blamed for this, with traditionalists claiming that Thompson had strayed too far away from Carril’s system, making upsets impossible. These folks were undoubtedly ecstatic when Joe Scott was hired to replace Thompson, figuring this signaled a return to the glory days. Fast-forward 20 months and it’s been anything but, while a revisionist respect for John Thompson III’s coaching abilities seems to grow every time Princeton goes to the locker room at halftime with fewer than 20 points.

So what exactly did Thompson bring to the table that was so different from his successor? Namely, flexibility. In many ways this was a continuation of what Bill Carmody had been doing with the program. Carmody actually deserves a great deal of the credit for “modernizing” the offense at Princeton. Inheriting a talented roster, he green-lighted shots early in the shot clock and would frequently press inferior opponents. And to be fair, Pete Carril wasn’t entirely inflexible. How else do you explain Princeton putting up 95 points against Cornell in his penultimate season?

Like Carmody, Thompson recognized that Princeton played two types of games: Games in which it was outclassed physically and athletically, and games in which it was not. Running the shot clock down to single digits on every possession was a decent strategy against superior opponents, because it lowered the number of possessions in a game. This essentially shrank the sample size, which increased the probability of an aberrant result. (Read: an upset) Unfortunately, that blade cuts both ways. In most Ivy League games and a number of non-league games, Princeton is the more talented team and therefore only hurts itself by shortening the game like that.

So Thompson sped up the pace at which his teams played against weaker opponents. They still would run down the shot clock most possessions, but he gave his players the green light to take an early shot if they got an open look, as well as the option of driving to the basket with dribble penetration. His teams even would look to get out and attack in transition at times. For Tiger opponents, this meant they couldn’t afford to get complacent on defense for the first 25 seconds, couldn’t get overaggressive with a ballhandler on the perimeter, and had to hustle back on defense. In short, it made defending the Princeton offense much tougher for opposing defenses. The 2003-04 team averaged nearly 60 possessions per 40 minutes This year’s team averages just 53.6 despite playing three Patriot League schools, Monmouth, and slow-paced Temple.

However, the biggest Thompson reform was in the area of rebounding. Carril had traditionally forsaken the offensive rebound, opting to send his players back on defense to prevent an opponent from scoring in transition. That might be justifiable against major conference opponents, but who in the Ivy League is going to get out and beat you with the fastbreak? Thompson realized this, and built his team into the top rebounding club in the league in his final season. That team won the Ivy title in large part because of its rebounding, which was tops in the league by a wide margin in Ivy play. For the season, the Tigers rebounded at 29.1 percent on the offensive glass and 72.4 percent defensively, which ranked 18th in the nation. Contrast that with this season, when Princeton ranks 331st in the nation in offensive rebounding at a miniscule 17.6 percent and the defensive rebounding has fallen all the way to 66.1 percent.

After the loss at Harvard last year, I listened to Joe Scott dismiss the importance of rebounding in one breath, while praising a player for diving after a loose ball in the next. As I stood there listening to him talk, all I could think was, “How is a rebound different from any other loose ball?” Now a big part of the problems on the defensive boards is a consequence of Scott’s matchup zone defense, which can result in 5-9 Scott Greenman trying to box out an opposing center. But it’s clear from the numbers, the games, and quotes from Scott himself that he has chosen to de-emphasize rebounding.

Scott inherited a roster that had become increasingly specialized under Thompson, who recruited small point guards, big post players, and quick wings who could penetrate. He could have opted to go with a defensive scheme better suited to his personnel, but instead Scott insisted on forcing his matchup zone on the team, This inflexibility on his part has resulted in some defensive breakdowns, particularly in league play last season. Word quickly got around that all you had to do against Princeton’s matchup zone was work the ball around until you ended up with a mismatch — Greenman guarding your big man in the post or a Tiger big man trying to stay with a guard on the perimeter. Princeton fell from 149th in defensive efficiency in 2003-04 to 198th last season. A quarter of the way into the 2005-06 season, the Tigers have plummeted all the way to 246th.

So can Joe Scott turn around things at Princeton? Anyone who watched his teams at Air Force will be quick to tell you, “Definitely.” He has only brought in one recruiting class to Princeton at this point, so he’s still playing primarily with Thompson’s personnel. When Scott populates the roster with the sort of interchangeable parts he wants (tall guards and mobile big men with good passing skills and an outside shot), his schemes are going to look and work much better. Greater familiarity with his system will also help a great deal, as the players gain experience.

There are, however, a couple of reasons for concern about Scott’s ability to replicate his Air Force success at Princeton. There’s been a lot of discussion of his communication style, with accusations of berating players during games last season. While Carril was notorious for riding his players hard, Scott’s style has drawn criticism from those who say the drill sergeant approach might work at a military academy, but not in the Ivy League. To his credit, Scott has softened his tone with his players on the sidelines during games this season, though sources close to the program paint a picture of a team still very much in fear of its coach’s wrath.

The other key difference between Air Force and Princeton is that the Falcons play in a borderline-major conference. Because of lofty admissions requirements and the academy’s service obligation following graduation, Air Force can’t recruit at the same level as its conference rivals. This means it’s at a talent disadvantage in nearly every conference game it plays. Scott was therefore able to play the same slow-down giant-killing style in almost every game. Now that he’s back at Princeton and playing 14 Ivy League games and non-league schedule comprised mostly of non-major programs, that’s no longer the case. Scott needs to be less of a hardliner and more adaptable as a coach, changing the offensive attack depending on the opponent. If he can do this, you can bet Princeton will be back in its familiar spot near the top of the league in the near future.